Game-Theoretic Coordination Mechanisms in Distribution Channels: Integration and Extensions for Models Without Competition

A significant game-theoretic literature on the coordination of distribution channels has developed over the past three decades. We provide an extensive analysis of an important subset of this literature, channels without competition. We review four major models that build on the initial work of Jeuland and Shugan (1983) – who developed a quantity-discount schedule that induces channel members to set price and non-price, marketing-mix variables (MM-variables) at channel-coordinating levels. Moorthy (1987) criticized their schedule's complexity, arguing for a simpler wholesale contract that induces coordination by avoiding double marginalization.     

区域协同视角下长江经济带产业绿色发展研究

在长江经济带建设进程中,推动产业绿色发展及区域协同是破解资源、环境约束的重要突破口。基于非径向非角度SBM分析建立动态Malmquist模型,运用2000-2014年面板数据测算长江经济带产业绿色效率指数、效率变化指数、技术进步指数。在分析长江经济带时空分布的基础上,将其周边的11个省市划分为4个联盟,并对产业合作博弈过程中产业利益帕累托改进及其合作边界进行了探讨。最后,从区域协同视角出发,根据不同产业协作联盟,从空间合作策略、政策机制等方面提出了相关建议。     

众创背景下高校学生创新行为演化系统动力学分析

“互联网+”和“大众创业,万众创新”环境为高校学生参与创新创业提供了机会,而高校学生的创新行为又有益于推动我国创新驱动型经济发展。在分析众创模式下高校学生创新决策和创新行为演化的基础上,构建了创新需求者和高校学生创新行为演化博弈模型,采用系统动力学方法进一步描述博弈双方的动态决策过程。仿真结果表明：高校学生创新行为与需求者参与度相互影响,如果只有一方选择纳什均衡策略,双方无法达到演化均衡状态;当需求者选择参与策略概率大于0.2,或高校学生创新成果被采用的几率大于0.5时,系统会最终达到演化均衡状态。最后,从高校学生与政府视角,提出提升大学生创新创业水平的建议。     

军民融合技术协同创新行为分析

以军工企业和民用企业为研究对象,利用演化博弈模型研究军民融合协同行为的动态演化过程,分析双方在有限理性条件下的互动机理与策略选择,探寻支配双方协同创新的制约因素及影响机理。在此基础上,通过政府激励与契约惩处情景的设定,引入约束体系,构建奖惩机制下军民融合协同博弈理论模型,确定最优发展策略（协同创新,协同创新）状态稳定时奖励金与惩罚金的范围,对于构建军民融合协同创新体系具有一定参考价值和现实指导意义。     

产业技术能力与技术管理能力的协同区间及测度模型

本文基于系统观点,研究了技术能力与技术管理能力之间的协同耦合关系,并运用博弈论的方法,构建了协同分析矩阵模型,分析了技术能力和技术管理能力有效协同条件,识别了其有效协同的区间。由此揭示出产业技术能力与技术管理能力协同耦合的特征和规律,从而为推动产业发展提供了有益的参考和借鉴。     

基于微分博弈的乳制品供应链质量管理研究

考虑到合理的成本分担及公平的利润分配是影响乳制品供应链系统稳定及乳制品质量保证的重要环节,本文以一个乳制品加工企业、一个奶农(牧场)和一个零售商所构成的三级供应链为研究对象,引入微分博弈的方法,研究在4种不同的乳制品质量管理博弈情形下,乳制品供应链上各成员企业愿意为质量管理工作付出的努力及其收益.研究结果表明,乳制品加工企业的质量控制和质量改进两种工作的努力程度在3种非合作质量管理博弈情形下具有相同的表现,而在合作质量管理博弈情形下,为了供应链整体利益考虑,核心企业即乳制品加工企业的质量管理工作努力程度发生了变化.而对于乳制品供应链上游的奶农和下游的零售商而言,二者对于质量管理工作的努力程度随着乳制品供应链合作的深化而不断提高,在理想的合作博弈情形下达到了最高.     

药品招标采购最优合同分析

在新医改方案出台后,药品招标采购又成为了热门话题,根据药品招标采购近10年来的运行情况,分析了药品招标采购存在的问题并运用博弈论的方法分析在药品招标采购中投标方与招标方的关系,运用信息博弈的视角分析如何才能达到最优的药品采购,并根据模型提出了相关的建议。     

Why is Price Dispersion Higher Online than Offline? The Impact of Retailer Type and Shopping Risk on Price Dispersion

When physically similar products, of similar quality, are offered by retailers both online and offline, we often observe that the dispersion in prices of these products online is greater than the price dispersion offline. This observation runs counter to early theories that suggested price dispersion online would be smaller than that offline due to the ease of search and information availability online. This paper investigates and provides an explanation for this puzzling phenomenon by examining the impact of two important drivers of price dispersion: retailer type and consumers’ shopping risk. Retailer type refers to whether a retailer is a pure offline, pure online, or dual channel retailer. Shopping risk is defined as the product of consumers’ perceived risk of shopping and the transaction uncertainty related to shopping at different types of retailers.A game-theoretic approach is adopted to model consumers’ price search and product purchase, as well as price competition within and across retailer types in online and offline markets. Equilibrium pricing strategies are derived for different retailer types competing for different consumer segments with different levels of perceived shopping risk. The impact of retailer type and shopping risk on online versus offline price dispersion are quantified, and conditions when price dispersion is greater online than offline are identified.Results indicate that price dispersion is greater online when the number of pure online retailers is sufficiently large and is increasing in the number of pure online retailers. In addition, a reduction in online shopping risk may actually increase online price dispersion. Results further suggest that even without any online sales, dual channel retailers should maintain their online presence for the purpose of information dissemination, which justifies the importance for pure offline retailer to incorporate webrooming strategies, where consumers can search for prices online but purchase offline.     

企业人力资本专用性投资研究——基于博弈论视角

从影响人力资本专用性投资的因素出发,构建了企业所有者与员工在人力资本专用性投资方面的博弈模型。研究发现,在信息不对称条件下,企业实施三项贴水措施,可促使企业所有者与员工双方,均能够从人力资本专用性投资中所获得的长期利益大大高于其由欺诈而获得的短期利益。这样,在促使双方博弈达到均衡的同时,亦加速了企业人力资本的专用性投资。     

劳动合同对于进城务工人员收入影响的有效性分析

本文重点讨论了《劳动合同法》的颁布对于进城务工人员收入的影响,我们用博弈论模型证明了签订劳动合同可以提高务工人员的收入,并且在一定条件下企业也可以通过生产率的上升而获利,实现双赢。从统计上看,签订合同的工人月收入高出347.19元,小时收入高出2.16元,OLS回归结果也发现合同对于收入有显著的正影响。但同时我们注意到有合同的劳动者本身有着更好的素质,Probit和Logit模型都验证了这一点,基于这种可能的内生性偏误,我们使用了处置效应来控制这一问题,并发现签订合同依旧显著提高了收入,估计月收入提高14.0%—14.9%,小时收入提高18.2%—21.5%。